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THE NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:
COUNSEL PHILIP HALPERN
USTICE PHILIP HALPERN was appointed Counsel to the New York
State Public Service Commission effective January 1, 1944. The duties
of Counsel to the Commission are wide-spread in scope. In addition to defending
Commission determinations before Appellate Courts, he represents the Commission in all of its litigation. He represents the Commission before federal regulatory
agencies when the Commission determines to appear in their proceedings on
behalf of New York state consumers. In addition, he acts as house counsel for
the Commission. He advises the Commission of the legality or legal import,
complications or consequences of proposed determinations.
Counsel to the .Public Service Commission occupies a position which is
vastly different from that of Counsel to other State Departments which have
a limited function of house counsel. The Attorney General is the State's attorney
and is in charge of virtually all of the State's legal proceedings. Counsel to
the Commission however acts independently of the Attorney General. He represents not only the Commission, but in addition is duty bound to protect the
interests of the people of the State of New York in all actions and proceedings
in which the Commission is involved.
The public Service Commission has a wide jurisdiction over the utilities
subject to its jurisdiction. In the transportation field these include railroad
companies insofar as intrastate operations are concerned, omnibus companies,
contract carriers of passengers and common and contract carriers of property.
In addition, all gas, electric, telephone, telegraph, water and steam companies
are regulated by the Commission. Briefly, the Commission's regulatory power
,-encompasses the fixation of rates, adequacy and safety of service, and the
issuance of securities. In order to effectuate its regulatory jurisdiction, the
Commission determines whether they should be granted the certificate necessary
before they may commence operations and is empowered with general supervision
over such companies.
This article is concerned with Justice Halpern's four year tenure of service
with the Commission. It is obvious from the importance of the position that
only the most significant matters handled by him, and those which have a
long-standing impact upon public utility regulation, can be encompassed herein.
Counsel Halpern made lasting contributions in the field of administrative
law by successfully defending actions of the Commission against various legal
assaults.
On April 12, 1945, the Commission adopted an order prescribing temporary
reduced fares for Syracuse Transit Corporation, effective May 1, 1945. The
opinion of the presiding Commissioner containing the usual findings upon which
the order was based, was not adopted at the same time because the Commissioner
was ill and other members of the Commission desired to suggest certain changes
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in his report. On April 25th the Commissioner's report was unanimously adopted.
On April 26, 1945, an action was instituted against the Commission in equity
to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission's order on the ground that it
was void for lack of findings. The Commission had never been confronted with
this problem but Halpern was successful in convincing the court that the order
itself contained sufficient jurisdictional findings, and in any event the Commission's order of April 12th was not void, but at worst merely voidable, because
any insufficiency of findings was validated upon the subsequent adoption of
the Commissioner's report prior to the effective date of the order. The company's
application for a stay was denied and it thereafter discontinued the action and
the temporary fares prescribed by the Commission became effective.'
In May of 1946 the Commission directed Rochester Gas & Electric Company to enter certain entries upon its books and accounts reducing the dollar
amount of its plant accounts. Applications for rehearing to the Commission
may be made pursuant to Section 22 of the Public Service Law, which provides
that the Commission shall act thereupon within thirty days. The company made
a timely application to the Commission for rehearing. The Commission did not
act upon the application until forty days thereafter when it granted rehearing.
The company instituted a proceeding to review the Commission's May determination, contending that since the Commission had not acted within the
prescribed period of thirty days the grant of rehearing on July 23rd was a
nullity, and the May order was reviewable. Counsel Halpern moved to dismiss
on the ground that the matter was still pending before the Commission. The
court upheld his position that the language of Section 22 was directory only
and not mandatory despite the use of the word "shall," and the Commission
2
had jurisdiction to act after the expiration of the thirty-day period.
Counsel Halpern made additional contributions to the field of administrative
law by successfully contending that in certain matters other than those specified
by statute the Commission had a continuing jurisdiction, and could re-open
Commission, whose functions were transferred to the Public Service Commission
on its own motion, a matter apparently finally determined by it. The Transit
in 1943 had adopted various orders determining that public welfare required the
elimination of specified grade crossings of the Staten Island Railroad and
streets in Staten Island and approving the final elimination plans rendering the
project ready for construction in 1941. World War II prevented construction and
in 1944 the Commission, seeking to consider a change in the plans to achieve a
saving of approximately one million dollars to the State, upon Counsel's advice
adopted an order reopening the proceeding. The Railroad and the City of New
York challenged the power of the Commission to reopen and instituted a proceeding in the nature of prohibition to restrain the Commission. The courts
1. Syracuse Transit Corp. v. Maltbie, 55 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1945).
2. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Maltbie, 272 App. Div. 163, 71 N.Y.S.2d 326 (3d
Dep't 1947).
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held that the Commission had the jurisdiction and the duty whenever the
public interest so required, to give consideration to any changes in the plan
or method of elimination which would be in the public interest, despite a
lengthy line of cases holding that a public agency could not reopen a proceeding
once it had reached a final determination. The courts adopted Halpern's thesis
that the Commission had a continuing jurisdiction over grade crossing elimi8
nations and could consider changes even after the adoption of a final order.
Halpern's ingenuity was again displayed when the Commission, after a
series of proceedings and legal disputes with the International Railway Company which provided omnibus and trolley service in Buffalo and Niagara Falls
(now served by Niagara Frontier Transit) determined that even the full
exercise of its powers had not sufficiently protected the public interest. He
drafted legislation, 4 which became Section 119 of the Public Service Law,
empowering the Commission to order a utility to file a petition for bankruptcy
with the federal courts. The Commission instituted a proceeding to exercise
its new power with respect to the International Railway Company. The company
applied to the Supreme Court for an order in the nature of a prohibition, enjoining the Commission from holding its proceeding on the ground that Section
119 was violative of the Federal and New York State constitutions. Before the
case was decided at Special Term, the company ceased contesting the constitutionality of the Commission's powers and filed a petition for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act.
Counsel Halpern's legal skill had its impact upon many substantive aspects
the
Commission's actions. The Commission -was empowered by Section 114
of
the
Public Service Law to prescribe temporary rates subject to provisions
of
set forth therein, including a provision requiring the Commission to take into
consideration in the fixation of permanent rates, the financial effect upon the
company of such temporary rates during the period when they were in effect.
This "recoupment" provision was aimed at avoiding constitutional arguments
which the utilities had been using to delay the effective date of rate reductions.
The constitutionality of Section 114 was challenged by the utilities. In
one such attempt, the Staten Island Edison Corporation commenced an action
in equity to enjoin the enforcement of a temporary rate order prescribed by the
Commission. That action was argued by Counsel Halpern in the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality of Section 114 and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 5
The utilities also sought to obtain a stay of the effective date of the
Commission's order prescribing temporary rates pending review thereof. In a
series of cases Counsel Halpern's argument that a temporary rate order could
3. City of New York v. Maltbie, 53 N.Y.S.2d 234, 248-49 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 269
App. Div. 662, 53 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1st Dep't 1945), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 931, 63 N.E.2d 119 (1945).
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 334, eff. Mar. 24, 1947.
5. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 292 N.Y. 611, 55 N.E. 376 (1944), affirming,
267 App. Div. 72, 45 N.Y.S.2d 337 (3d Dep't 1943).
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become effective forthwith or within a short time after the adoption of the
6
order was accepted.
In order for Section 114 to be promptly utilized and to accomplish effective
regulation in numerous other respects, it is necessary for the Commission to
ensure that the entries in the books, records and accounts of utilities subject
to its jurisdiction are made properly and kept current. In a series of accounting
cases Counsel Halpern successfully defended Commission accounting determinations directing companies to delete amounts from their plant accounts improperly entered therein. The importance of these accounting determinations
cannot be overemphasized. By the elimination of amounts improperly charged
to plant accounts the Commission is in a better position to thwart any attempts
of utilities to inflate the amount upon which they may earn a return.
Another instance of Counsel Halpern's effect upon regulation occurred
when several omnibus companies operating in New York City challenged the
Commission's jurisdiction to regulate their fares because the fares had been
set forth in franchises granted by the City pursuant to various provisions of
the New York City charter. Counsel Halpern successfully defended the Commission's position and secured dismissal of all the proceedings. The courts upheld Halpern's argument that the Commission had power to regulate such fares
7
despite the fact that they were fixed in the City's franchises.
Counsel Halpern's efforts to defend the Commission's position were not
always successful. In 1947 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation applied
to the Commission for authority to issue securities totaling over 20 million
dollars. At that time the Commission was holding a proceeding with respect
to the books and records of the company in which the staff had questioned
17 million dollars in the company's property accounts. The Commission authorized the company to issue the securities upon condition that it make annual
reservations to appropriated surplus before payment of dividends on the common
stock, said reservations to continue until they totaled the amount in question,
indicating that if such reservations subsequently turned out to be excessive,
such excess would be transferred to the company's surplus account free of all
restrictions.
The company refused to accept these conditions contending that the
Commission's power to pass upon its security application under Section 69
of the Public Service Law did not encompass the power to impose the conditions. Despite Counsel Halpern's efforts to defend the Commission's position,
the Appellate Division annulled its determination by a vote of three to two. 8
6. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maitbie, supra note 5; Syracuse Transit Corp. v.
Maltbie, 55 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1945); Rochester Transit Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, unreported decision of Murray, J., Supreme Court, Albany County, March 29,
1945, vacating stay provision in order to show cause of March 27, 1945.
7. Queens-Nassau Transit Lines v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 893, 72 N.E.2d 618 (1947), affirming, 271 App. Div. 81, 63 N.Y.S.2d 712 (3d Dep't 1946), affirming, 186 Misc. 424, 61 N.Y.S.2d
81 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
8. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 273 App. Div. 114, 76 N.Y.S.2d 671
(3d Dep't 1948).
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Subsequent to Halpern's resignation as Counsel, the Court of Appeals affirmed.9
In another series of cases Counsel Halpern successfully established the
Commission's assertion that utilities could not abandon operations without
securing the Commission's approval. The statutory authority for such assertion
of power was very meager.
In Springbrook Water Company v. Village of Hudson Falls,10 Counsel
Halpern achieved a major advance in establishing the Commission's position
that utilities could not discontinue operations without its consent. That proceeding involved a sale of a private water company to a municipality over
which the Commission had no jurisdiction. The company had applied to the
Commission for approval of the transfer without prejudice to its position that
the Commission had no jurisdiction thereover. The Commission determined that
the price agreed upon between the village and the company was unreasonable
and the transfer was not in public interest and indicated that if the price were
reduced to $200,000, which the Commission held to be reasonable it would approve the transfer. The company sought specific performance of the contract
and entered into a submission of controversy with the village before the
Appellate Division, Third Department. The company's argument was that
per the language of the Section 89-h of the Public Service Law, the Commission's
approval of a transfer was limited to transfers between corporations subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction and did not encompass transfers to municipalities which were not within the Commission's jurisdiction. The company's
position was supported by the fact that in numerous instances throughout
the Public Service Law the legislature had drawn a clear line between private
corporations and municipal corporations and the language of Section 89-h
specified transfer to corporations only and did not even mention municipal
corporations.
Counsel Halpern appeared as amicus curiae and argued in defense of the
Commission's power by asserting that Section 89-h was operative with respect
to the transfer and not with the acquisition of the property. In support thereof
he contended that the entire spirit of the Public Service Law including
provisions that utilities keep rates for their service on file with the Commission, necessarily empowered the Commission to pass upon a proposed abandonment of service by a utility. He argued that it made no difference whether the
cessation of utility service was by transfer or otherwise and that it was unimportant to whom the property was being transfered. He argued that the Commission's consent was necessary for a sale to anyone. The Appellate Division
upheld Counsel Halpern's argument holding that the fundamental question
before the court was whether a public utility having embarked upon a public
enterprise and having dedicated its property to the public use could cease
rendering such service without the consent of the Commission.
9.
10.

Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Maltbie, 298 N.Y. 867, 84 N.E.2d 635 (1949).
269 App. Div. 515, 56 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't 1945).
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In his last court proceeding as Counsel for the Commission Halpern
wrapped up the Commission's jurisdiction over abandonments of service by
utility companies and demonstrated his outstanding legal qualifications and
ability to act with extreme rapidity. The Long Beach Bus Company had
advised the Commission by letter dated November 5, 1947, that it was going
to cease operations within ten days because of its great financial losses. Counsel
Halpern and his staff worked over the weekend and instituted a summary proceeding by means of an order to show cause signed on the 10th and returnable
on the 14th. Halpern's contention that the company needed the Commission's
approval to discontinue operations was upheld on the 17th. Because the
company claimed that it was in extreme financial difficulties an immediate
appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which heard
argument, upheld Halpern's position, and granted leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals on the same day. At the commencement of the argument
the Chief Justice called counsel's attention to the fact that no notice of appeal
had been filed. By general agreement the court heard the argument and a
notice of appeal was filed thereafter. On the 27th, the Court of Appeals handed
down a unanimous opinion reaffirming the principle that no public utility could
discontinue service without prior approval of the Commission."
At the conclusion of the argument, Chief Justice Loughran leaned over
the bench and said to Counsel Halpern:
Now you sit down. There's something I want to say to you.... You have
argued here with great dialectical and professional skill and often
have saved this court from committing error-an undertaking at
which many lawyers feel they had indifferent success. Now you are
going on to a high 2office. I am confident you will serve with distinction
and great credit.1
On December 31, 1947 he resigned to become a Justice of the Supreme
Court.
SAMEL R. MADISON, Secretary
New York State Public Service Commission
11. Maltbie v. Long Beach Bus Co., 297 N.Y. 723, 77 N.E.2d 21 (1947), afirndng, 272
App. Div. 1069, 75 N.Y.S.2d 304 (2d Dep't 1947), affirming, 75 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
12. Buffalo Evening News, Nov. 28, 1947, p. 8, col. 1.

